Abstract
To sum up, complex system theory suggests that in order to properly understand the emergence 19 and spread of infectious diseases it is important to analyse a set of relevant processes that span 20 across different spatio-temporal scales, as defined by the focal, upper and lower levels. This task,
21
as we will argue in the course of this article, can only be accomplished by using 22 integrated/multidisciplinary approaches. Among the numerous set of interactions occurring at this level, we will discuss three that appear 7 to be particularly suited to illustrate the operation of causality. Two of such interactions, namely 8 the relationship between macroeconomic growth and globalization and between disease 9 prevalence and macroeconomic growth, point to the existence of autocatalysis. The third one, the 10 relationship between disease prevalence or risk and health policies, indicates the existence of a a 11 self-stabilizing process.
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Macroeconomic expansion, globalization and infectious diseases 14
Economic theory points out how the relationship between the level of economic activity (for 8 Another set of self-reinforcing processes within the focal level refers to the interactions between 
The macroeconomic cost of infectious diseases
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pesticide application in USA at approximately US $ 10 billion per annum, to which indirect costs 1 (e.g., environmental, health related etc.) of about US $ 9-12 billion per annum must be added.
2
At the same time it is well understood that poor socio-economic conditions may favour both the 3 emergence and the spread of several infectious diseases. Infection emergence/spread and poor 4 socio-economic conditions also form an autocatalysis. 
15
If effective, such policies will slow down the spread of the disease revealing a negative feedback 16 between disease risk and policy responses, which resemble those operating in a prey/predator 17 system. Other negative feedbacks at the focal level may result, for example, by the effect of accompanied by a series of socio-economic changes, including population ageing, which can 22 also play an important role in increasing population susceptibility . Finally environmental change resulting from macroeconomic growth can also lead to the emergence of infectious diseases. At the lower level, the search for causes is normally intended as the identification of the individuals and the probability that once an 'appropriate' contact has occurred, the infection will 7 be transmitted. If the contact rate between individuals is (at least partially) determined by 8 probability judgments and behavioural choices, then cross fertilization between economics and 9 psychology can provide useful insights. The recognition that an individual's behaviour should be 10 explicitly included in models of epidemics is not new. A more interesting observation is that, at 11 least for directly transmitted diseases, human behaviour is likely to be adaptive as it will at the 12 same time affect and respond to the course of epidemics. Unfortunately to this date empirical 13 research, which explicitly matches adaptive behaviour to epidemics, is sparse (Fergusson, 2007) . Although human behaviour is so important in the spread of a disease, and individuals alter their 21 behaviour when the disease progresses (as in this case also the probability of getting infected will 
Beyond Homo Oeconomicus
17
Economic theory suggests that human behavior can largely be understood as individual rational of relevance to this article is that of "public goods", defined as goods which are non-rival and 2 non-excludable. These properties imply that it is problematic to supply public goods through 3 markets, because of the free-rider problem.
4
Infectious disease control has public good properties since, for whatever level of disease control 5 attained, everyone benefits regardless of whether they help meet the costs involved. These costs 6 are not only financial. For example, a vaccination program for swine flu might involve each 7 participant suffering a mild version of the symptoms of the pathogen, but the public health 8 benefits of this action (a small increment in 'herd immunity') accrue to the entire population. Although there are private benefits from vaccination (self-protection), a person for whom self 10 protection is outweighed by the induced symptoms would not be expected to be swayed by the 11 public health rationale for vaccination. Moreover, an individual who has been infected may have 12 no rational choice reason at all to avoid infecting others, since he or she would incur the costs of 13 self-isolation, would not benefit from disease control, and might not feel sufficiently altruistic 14 towards the generality of the rest of the population to pay those costs.
15
Economics cannot fully explain the motivational aspect of public health campaigns, since silence 16 on this matter is a corollary of taking preferences as given. In such situations economists 17 (typically) suggest that the best way to change behavior is to alter the "external" incentive Extrinsic motivations refer to the set of incentives applied from outside and include both 6 economic incentives (e.g., changes in relative prices through taxes/subsidies) and regulatory 7 ones. Intrinsic motivations come from within the person (Deci, 1971). Although economists do 8 not deny the existence of intrinsic motivations, they normally assume that they can just be added 9 to extrinsic ones. Hence, introducing economic incentives will always generate the desired 10 behavioural changes. In the context of the consumer choice theory, for example, it is assumed 11 that changes in income and/or relative prices (i.e., the extrinsic motivations) will not affect the 12 shape of the preference maps (i.e., the intrinsic motivations which are taken as given). Empirical forthcoming under the former regime, and the blood was also of higher quality (Titmuss, 1970).
19
Thus economic incentives triggered a crowding-out effect which, repressing the expression of 20 altruism on behalf of donors, created counterproductive effects in the "blood market".
21
These considerations are likely to be important in the context of infectious diseases. As the role 22 of human behaviour in the spread and emergence of infectious diseases becomes more apparent, policy interventions aiming at promoting desired behavioural changes (e.g., social distancing) 1 may be required. It is then crucial to understand how such policies will affect aspects influencing 2 adaptive behaviour (social norms, habits, choices involving computations and intrinsic In the previous sections, drawing on adaptive complex systems and hierarchy theory, we have 7 attempted to provide a narrative integrating the economics and ecology of infectious diseases.
8
The main lesson from complex systems theory is that causality can operate simultaneously at 9 different hierarchical levels. It is worth dwelling for a moment on this, by identifying three broad shows that currently most of the applied research has been focused on the first two aspects, and 6 to a lesser extent on the third aspect. With respect to the latter, there is still a lack of empirical 7 research aimed at characterizing the evolution of contact rates in large populations following a 8 disease outbreak. For the purpose of future research, these considerations have several important 9 implications.
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Consider for example the case of an infection occurring in a given population whose size is 11 constant and normalized to 1. Assuming that no immunity exists, at any point in time t, the 12 population can be partitioned into infected/infectious (I t ) and susceptible (S t =1-I t ). Let the focal individuals in the population and on the infection rate of 'decay' (ω). Clearly both the 1 transmission rate and the decay rate are not necessarily constant over time, and given our 2 discussion so far they are affected by changes in environmental conditions (E t ), but also by conditions (E t ) and other possible explanatory variables (X t ).
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Consider now the upper level dynamics. In this respect we strongly encourage continuing on the 
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Consider next the lower level dynamics. We have identified the need to achieve a better 11 We already discussed how human behavior (e.g., contact rates, that we labeled C t ) plays an 12 important role in shaping the course of an infection. As individual behavior is adaptive it will 13 certainly change as the structure of prevailing incentives and pay-offs (here intended as extrinsic 14 motivations) change. First, as the pay-offs reflect the benefit/costs associated with the contact 15 rates, it is likely that the latter will depend on the general macroeconomic conditions (Y t ). For 16 example, in the case of zoonotic diseases the ability of an individual to reduce contacts with 17 animals will clearly depend on its effects on economic returns and so on factors like economic 18 damage, market prices, costs of equipment, type of farm, economic status and level of education.
Characterizing adaptive human behaviour
19
The willingness of an individual to avoid travelling and spread and/or contract an infectious 20 disease will depend also on her socio-economic status. Similarly the incentives for an individual 21 to seek treatment will also depend on the set of prevailing incentives. Therefore, for a given 22 disease and relevant populations, data on socio-economic characteristics need to be considered.
As the pay-offs are likely to be different for infected/infectious and susceptible individuals (and 1 as the proportions of each in the population change with changes in prevalence), the behavioural 2 variables will change with infection prevalence. The very fact that human behaviour is adaptive 
Characterizing the interactions between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations 21
In section five we introduced the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations as 22 determinants of human behaviour. Efforts to understand the human behaviour components in disease ecology models should account for both. This may seem an almost impossible task, as We know that (as the direct purpose of the regulation is to reduce person-to-person 19 contacts). We also know that (as a stronger intrinsic motivation to reduce personal 23 a.
: in this case the total effect will be given just by and the regulation will : in this case the total effect will be given by and the 4 regulation will be even more effective as extrinsic motivations 'crowd in' intrinsic ones.
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c.
: in this case the total effect will be weaker as extrinsic motivations 'crowd out' 6 intrinsic ones. In extreme cases where behaviour may even change in the 7 opposite direction than the intended one. In some contexts, experimental methods can be used to tease out the sign (rather than the 10 magnitude) of (Bowles, 2008) . Such an exercise, to be ideally performed on a case-by-case 11 basis perhaps using localised trials, is necessary for two reasons. First, if a relationship between 12 extrinsic and intrinsic motivation exists in a particular context, one will not be able to properly 13 understand behavioural responses unless that relationship is appropriately characterised.
14 Secondly, any policy proposal aiming at modifying human behaviour for the control of infectious 15 diseases should be designed after considering the possibility of crowding-out effects in order to 16 avoid unpleasant surprises.
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The considerations expressed so far suggest that one way to capture the dynamics of the lower level is to characterise the following expression including infection prevalence (I t ), macroeconomic conditions (Y t ), policy (R t ), and other 5 explanatory variables (e.g., disease novelty or information on its consequences) (X t ) must be 6 carefully considered. 
Joint estimation of epidemiological and socio-economic responses 9
This last point is a methodological one and relates to the specification of statistical/econometric 10 models required to correctly estimate the relevant parameters in the epidemiological-economic where expressions (3) and (5) can be considered.
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At this stage the reader may feel frustrated, under the impression that our discussion simply 12 posits that everything is related to everything. On the other hand, the traditional analysis of (2.a -2.d), (3) and (5) will help to understand the current drivers of change, while our ability to 13 predict will never be complete. We believe that Woolhouse (2011) claim that predictive 14 modelling is "the art of the possible" should be interpreted in this sense. 
